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I. INTRODUCTION
A little over thirty years ago Congress enacted the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 1 a comprehensive reform of the
existing system of pension regulation. 2 Solidly into its fourth decade,
ERISA has been the object of much commentary as the various federal
courts have struggled to infuse its complicated and sometimes imprecise
pieces with coherent meaning. 3 Some have suggested that ERISA's
* With apologies to Governor Deval Patrick and President Barack Obama. The phrase
"Together We Can" was used as Governor Patrick's campaign theme in his run for the Massachusetts
Governorship. See Associated Press, Obama Using Parts of Deval Patrick's Campaign,
SEACOASTONLINE, Jan. 13, 2008, <http://www.seacoastonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/2008
0113/NEWS/80l13037l&sfad=l>. President Obama used the related phrase "Yes We Can" as his
campaign slogan.
* Professor of Law, Boston University.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 29 U.S.C. (2000)).
2. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A

POLITICAL HISTORY 1 (2004) ("ERISA was Congress's attempt to devise a comprehensive regulatory
program to protect millions of American workers who looked to private pension plans for financial
support in their retirement years.").
3. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996) (defining scope of fiduciary duties);
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995) (resolving procedural issues that arise
when employers amend a retirement or welfare plan to alter participant benefits); Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (defining the term "employee" under ERISA). For critiques of the
Court's ERISA decisions see, e.g., Donald T. Bogan, ProtectingPatientRights Despite ERISA: Will the
Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REv. 951 (2000); John H.
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primary goal of reducing the risk to employees of employer default has
largely been achieved.4 Others believe that almost every aspect of the
statute relating to pensions has been at least modestly successful' but that
those provisions of the statute dealing with health insurance and other
welfare plans 6 cry out for significant reform. 7
In their new book, Employee Pensions: Policies, Problems
Possibilities, editors Teresa Ghilarducci and Christian E. Weller have
assembled a group of essays which seeks to evaluate and reform existing
pension policy. Of the eleven authors whose work Ghilarducci and Weller
have collected and edited, only two are trained as lawyers. The others are
mostly economists with a few public policy academics and practitioners
rounding out the mix. For ERISA lawyers in the audience, the book
provides a welcome opportunity to focus on pension benefits issues
through a non-legal lens. Rather than parsing various provisions of the
statute and relevant cases, the authors in this collection take up the question
of the future of employee pensions from the perspective of economics,
labor organizing, and simple income security. It is a refreshing read for
anyone who is typically limited to legal materials when thinking about
Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable":The Supreme Court's Trail ofError in Russel, Mertens,
and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1317 (2003); Colleen E. Medill, Resolving the JudicialParadox
of "Equitable"Relief Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 827 (2006); Richard
Rouco, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section 502(a), 45 ALA. L. REv. 631 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993) ("ERISA is, we have observed,
a comprehensive and reticulated statute, the product of a decade of congressional study of the Nation's
private employee benefit system.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Jensen v. Moore Wallace N.
Am., Inc., 249 F. App'x 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2007) (describing ERISA as containing "a highly reticulated,
national and exclusive set of rules") (internal quotation marks omitted); Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip.,
Inc., 72 F.3d 822, 827 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that the complexity of ERISA indicates its
comprehensive nature).
5. See, e.g., Michael S. Sirkin, The 20 Year History ofERISA, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 321, 323-24
(noting that "the labor provisions of ERISA have remained reasonably steady" and ERISA in general as
being "remarkably resilient").
6. ERISA covers two types of employee benefit plans: pension benefit plans and welfare benefit
plans. A pension benefit plan generally "(i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a
deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or
beyond." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (2000). A welfare benefit plan generally provides for medical,
unemployment, and certain other non-pension employee benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
7. See, e.g., John Bronsteen et al., ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in the
UnitedStates, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2297 (2008) (arguing that most of our health care crisis arises from
unmitigated ERISA agency cost problems, meaning that the statute encourages employer and insurerprincipals to act in ways that are contrary to the interests of their insured employee-agents); Joanne
Deschenaux, ERISA Pre-emption Reaches Congress, HRMAG., July 2007, at 36 (reporting that state
health care reform advocates pressed Congress to act to lessen or remove ERISA limitations on state
health care reform); Frank P. Fedor & River Sung, The Conflict Between ERISA and Local Healthcare
Reform, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., May 2008, at 38 (discussing the need to loosen ERISA's
preemption of state and local law to allow for state and local health care reform); Karl Polzer & Patricia
A. Butler, Employee Health Plan Protections Under ERISA, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 93,
available at <http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/16/5/93.pdf> (criticizing ERISA for producing
limited or uneven protections for consumer health benefits).
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pensions, and each of the essays is accessible enough that students would
also benefit from exposure to the book.
Employee Pensions is organized in a way that quickly reveals the
policy biases of both the editors and contributors. Each essay is located in
one of four major sections: "Justification for the Employer-Based System,"
"Getting Defined Benefit Plans Ready for the Future," "Ways to Improve
Defined Contribution Plans," and "Understanding the Political Dimensions
of Pension Reform." In the first essay, the editors make their views about
pension reform plain: the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA)8 fails to
deal adequately with "high degrees of inequality in retirement saving
accumulations by income and race, high costs of defined contribution plan
administration, lack of support for innovative defined benefit pension
design, and corporate disincentives to sponsor pensions." 9 The PPA, the
editors believe, "discourage[s] firms from continuing [defined benefit]
plans." 1 0 This is because the PPA "goes overboard in the opposite direction
by making perfectly sound companies speed up funding for any pension
debt, thereby raising the unpredictability of pension contributions.""
Throughout their essay, indeed throughout Section I, the consistent
message is that defined benefit plans are superior to defined contribution
plans and, therefore, as much as possible should be done to encourage
employers to offer defined benefit plans. However, the PPA discourages
defined benefit plans and favors defined contribution arrangements without
"addressing the existing shortcomings of [defined contribution] plans."l 2
The shortcomings of defined contribution plans include hidden, often high
fees that can substantially erode a plan participant's account balance. 13
II. PREFERENCE FOR DEFINED BENEFIT OVER DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
PLANS

Several of the contributors to this volume mention the revitalization of
strong labor unions as one tactic for increasing the availability of pensions
for U.S. workers,1 4 so it is not surprising to find strong support for defined

9.

EMPLOYEE PENSIONS: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, AND POSSIBILITIES 3 (Teresa Ghilarducci

&

8. Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 & 29 U.S.C.).
Christian E. Weller eds., 2007) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE PENSIONS].
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 4.
14. There are a variety of reasons to be dubious about this claim. See, e.g., Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l
Educ. Ass'n, -No. C-07-5339RBL, 2008 WL 2179530 (W. D. Wash. May 23, 2008), in which school
teachers allege their union promoted and endorsed annuities without revealing that the union received
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benefit plans over defined contribution plans, although some of the essays
in Section III ("Ways to Improve Defined Contribution Plans") seem to
grudgingly acknowledge that defined contribution plans seem likely to
continue to enjoy significant growth as defined benefit plans continue to
decline.15 I must confess I've never fully understood organized labor (and
its supporters') consistent preference for defined benefit plans over defined
contribution plans and nothing in this volume sheds any light on this bias.
As all students of ERISA know, a defined benefit plan places the risk of
investment failure on the plan (or plan sponsor/employer) itself. That is, the
core responsibility of coming up with sufficient dollars to cover future plan
liabilities rests with the plan in a defined benefit arrangement.16 Plan
participants (or "workers" in language preferred by many of the book's
authors) enjoy an amount of guaranteed pay after a defined number of
years of service based on those years of service and the amount of salary.
That is, a participant can figure out with a high degree of certainty what his
pension will be in advance of retirement.
The most important distinction between defined benefit and defined
contribution plans is that in the defined contribution arrangement,
investment risk is placed on the plan participant/worker. A participant in a
defined contribution plan runs the risk that there may be little or no money
available to support a comfortable retirement if the market performs poorly
or investment choices prove to be unwise. For this reason, many have
written about the need for high quality "investor education" for employees
who are participating in defined contribution plans. 17 The reason that a
millions of dollars in payments ("undisclosed commissions") from the underlying insurer in exchange
for encouraging teachers to sign up.
15. Over the past few decades, defined benefit and defined contribution plans have gone in
opposite directions in their popularity among active-workers. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST.,
FACTS FROM EBRI 1 (2007), <http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0607fact.pdf>. In 1979,
active-worker participants enrolled in only defined benefit plans far outweighed participation in only
defined contribution plans: 62 percent to 16 percent. Id. By 2005, defined benefit and defined
contribution plans had effectively switched places with exclusive enrollment in defined benefit plans
dropping to 10 percent while exclusive enrollment in defined contribution plans increased to 63 percent.
Id.
16. The sponsoring employer of a defined benefit plan has an obligation to sufficiently fund the
plan so that the value of the plan's assets will cover defined participant benefits that are "typically
determined by a formula based on a combination of . . participant[s'] earnings and years of service
with the employer." COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND

PRACTICE 112 (2d ed. 2007). Federal law requires a sponsoring employer to maintain a minimum level
of funding, which puts a financing liability on the employer that can drastically change from year to
year depending on changes in actuarial assumptions and plan assets' investment performance. Id.; Craig
Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic Differences and Trends,
2006, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF No. 311, Nov. 2007, at 5, available at <http://www.
ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRIIB_11-20074.pdf>.
17. See, e.g., Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Investment Without Education: The DisparateImpact on
Women and Minorities in Self-Directed Defined ContributionPlans, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 223,
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strong, consistent preference for defined benefit plans mystifies me is that,
notwithstanding ERISA, no one has yet figured out how to eliminate all
default risk for defined benefit plans. In other words, traditional plans fail
too, and, as David Madland notes in The Politics of Pension Cuts, defined
benefit plans can be amended or converted to cash balance plans or
terminated as a result of plan sponsor (employer) bankruptcy or by the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 18
Simply put, a defined benefit plan is not an absolute guarantee to an
employee of a stream of pension income that will see the employee and his
spousel 9 through to the end of their retirement. Defined benefit plans can
and do fail as the faithful reader of any newspaper can attest: think about
United Airlines, Polaroid, and Bethlehem Steel.20 Of course, the authors'
objections to defined contribution plans are not without merit. It is just that
organized labor's consistent advocacy on behalf of defined benefit
arrangements is not supported by the economic experience of the past few
decades. Madland again: "a reasonable estimate is that over the past five
years, more than 10 million workers and retirees have seen their pension or
retiree health benefits significantly cut. The 10-million figure counts only
people who have had substantial retirement benefit losses and ignores
potentially important but relatively minor cuts, such as the elimination of
cost-of-living adjustments on pensions" 2 1
He notes, "[s]even hundred thousand people had their fully funded
pension plans [i.e. defined benefit plans] terminated in the period between
2000 and 2005, according to PBGC 2 2 data." 23 In addition to plan

268 (2001) ("All participants, including women, men, minorities, low-income workers, part-time
employees, youth, and the elderly must be taught the fundamentals of investments.").
18. David Madland, The Politics of Pension Cuts, in EMPLOYEE PENSIONS, supra note 9, at 187,
190-91.
19. See 29 U.S.C § 1055 (2000) (mandating that for defined benefit plans "(1) in the case of a
vested participant who does not die before the annuity starting date, the accrued benefit payable to such
participant shall be provided in the form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity, and (2) in the case of
a vested participant who dies before the annuity starting date and who has a surviving spouse, a
qualified preretirement survivor annuity shall be provided to the surviving spouse of such participant").
20. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Senate Passes Bill to Require Full Funding of Private Pensions,
WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2005, at DI; Micheline Maynard, The Basics; If an Airline Fails, Who Would
Care?, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, § 4, at 2; Mary Williams Walsh, Whoops! There Goes Another
Pension Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, § 3, at 1.
21. Madland, supra note 18, at 191.
22. The PBGC is a federal corporation that ERISA established to encourage the continuation and
maintenance of private pension plans, to make sure plan participants and beneficiaries receive their
pension benefits in a timely and uninterrupted manner, and to keep its premiums as low as possible. 29
U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2000). To accomplish these goals, the PBGC oversees the termination of defined
benefit plans and charges premiums from defined benefit plan sponsors to insure participants' benefits
against the "distress terminations" of underfunded plans. See MEDILL, supra note 16, at 242-44.
23. Madland, supra note 18, at 191.
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terminations,
a safe estimate is that the pension plans of 3 million workers, or 10
percent of workers with a pension, are currently frozen. However,
figures are rough: freezes are a relatively new trend that is rapidly
increasing . . . . [One study] estimate[s] that when a pension plan is
frozen, a typical married 40-year-old male employee loses nearly $5,000
of benefits in each year of retirement, or total of over $95,000 if he has
an average life span in retirement.24
And remember, this is a discussion about the defined benefit world! It
simply is not clear why the systematic risk associated with defined benefit
plans, which ERISA has clearly not been able to entirely eliminate, is
superior to the up-front risk of defined contribution plans. Indeed, a well
informed defined contribution participant no doubt understands that the risk
of plan failure will be borne by herself. I would bet that the typical defined
benefit participant is stunned to learn that the "guaranteed payout" which
was promised is in fact not guaranteed at all. Defined benefit plans, as we
all know, can be frozen, terminated (voluntarily or involuntarily),2 5 or
converted to cash balance plans.

III. THE POST-LARUE WORLD
Two of the essays in this volume are collected in Section III under the
heading "Ways to Improve Defined Contribution Plans." In the first piece
by Eric Rodriguez and Luisa Grilla-Chope entitled "How Can Defined
Contribution Plans Meet Worker Needs?" the authors recite Employee
Benefits Research Institute data about general pension coverage and
26
participation.
It comes as no surprise that many Black and Hispanic
employees have relatively low rates of coverage and participation.
Although they do not mention it, the lower coverage rates for minority
employees appear to correlate with their overrepresentation in the low
wage labor force. And, as several other contributors note, pension coverage
is greatest in better paying sectors of the economy. Maybe because they are
resigned to the decline in defined benefit plans, 2 7 Rodriguez and GrilloChope focus on changes to the existing regulatory regime for defined
24. Madland, supra note 18, at 191-92.
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (providing procedures for voluntary plan terminations of funded
and underfunded pension plans by plan administrators); 29 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000) (providing procedures
for the PBGC to initiate termination procedures against pension plans).
26. Eric Rodriguez & Luisa Grillo-Chope, How Can Defined Contribution Plans Meet Workers'
Needs?, in EMPLOYEE PENSIONS, supranote 9, at 123, 123-24.
27. Rodriguez and Grillo-Chope note "[t]he private employer-sponsored retirement savings
market is now dominated by [defined contribution] pension plans. From 1985 to 1999, the number of
private [defined benefit] pension plans dropped from 170,000 to 50,000, while the number of private
[defined contribution] pension plans increased from 462,000 to 683,000" (citation omitted). Id. at 126.
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contribution plans which they believe would increase retirement income
security. Their prescription for all that ails defined contribution plans
includes: enhance savings through automatic features, increase incentives
to participate, loosen eligibility criteria so more workers are eligible to
participate in 401(k) plans, increase education so workers can make
intelligent and informed investment decisions, and address the problem of
high expenses associated with many DC accounts. They identify three
kinds of risk associated with defined contribution plans: longevity risk (risk
that a plan participant will outlive his retirement assets), market risk (risk
of improper asset allocation), and investment risk ("workers have to
consider the financial market's performance before retirement; in a down
market, workers will be forced either to delay retirement or consume less
during retirement").2 8
Some of these concerns, especially those associated with market and
investment risk, were the object of scrutiny by the U.S. Supreme Court in
its recent decision in LaRue v. DeWolff Boberg & Associates.29 In LaRue
an unhappy participant in a 401(k) plan sued the plan administrator alleging
that failure to follow his investment directions "depleted" his account by
about $150,000 and amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty under the
statute, for which he was entitled to recover. A unanimous Supreme Court
held that §502(a)(2) of ERISA authorizes recovery for fiduciary breaches
that "impair the value of plan assets in a participant's individual account."3o
Some in the legal community were surprised at the result in LaRue
given the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell.3 1 The Russell Court held that a participant in a
group disability plan could not sue under §502(a)(2) to recover
consequential damages arising from a delay in processing her claim. The
Fourth Circuit 32 (and other observers) believed that the holding in Russell
precluded a decision in Mr. LaRue's (the participant's) favor. Indeed,
Russell and several subsequent Supreme Court decisions 33 addressing the
28. Id. at 127-28.
29. 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).
30. Id. at 1026.
31. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
32. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 450 F. 3d 570, 572-73 (4th Cir. 2006), vacated,
128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).
33. In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248 (1993), the Supreme Court ruled that §
502(a)(3) of ERISA did not allow for consequential damages. The Court based its opinion on
construing "appropriate equitable relief' to only refer to remedies that were historically available in
equity, which does not include consequential damages. Id. at 256-58. In Great-West Life & Annuity
Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), the Supreme Court again denied monetary damages,
this time stemming from a restitution claim, as being available under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA. The Court
distinguished between restitution that was typically available at law and restitution that was available at
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ability of ERISA plaintiffs to recover damages have been criticized in
various quarters, including members of the Court. 3 4
The tone and result in LaRue give, I think, hope to the various
contributors to Employee Pensions, and many others who have watched
over more than two decades as Russell evolved into a broad prohibition on
the ability of ERISA plaintiffs to access meaningful recoveries from plans
that caused them harm.3 5 (The contributors to this book are uniform in their
desire to see secure pensions, in particular defined benefit plans and other
ERISA plan benefits, made available to the widest possible audience of
American workers.) The tone of LaRue is encouraging because although
the Court asserts that "the misconduct alleged in Russell, by contrast, fell
outside this category" 36 (i.e. the list of duties ERISA trustees are charged to
uphold), it limits the holding in Russell. Like the authors whose work
Ghilarducci and Weller have collected and edited, the Court acknowledges
that "[the ERISA-regulated] landscape has changed." 3 7 Indeed, it suggests

&

equity, holding that restitution arising from supposed contractual duties was not "appropriate equitable
relief' as defined in Mertens. Id. at 212-14. For criticism of these cases and the Supreme Court's
treatment of ERISA damages in general, see Langbein, supra note 3, at 1362 ("The Supreme Court's
mishandling of ERISA remedy law has rendered the protections of ERISA illusory in any case in which
the victim of ERISA-proscribed wrongdoing needs damages for consequential injury in order to be
made whole."); Elaine McClatchey Darroch, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates: The Supreme Court's
Dismantling of Civil Enforcement Under ERISA, 1994 DET. C.L. REv. 1089 (1994); Dana M. Muir,
FiduciaryStatus As an Employer's Shield: The Perversity ofERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB.
EMP. L. 391, 461 (2000) ("Because of slavish adherence to ill-considered dicta in Russell, ERISA
jurisprudence has narrowly constrained the availability of remedies in the sphere of benefits
administration."); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 256-64 (2003); Maria Linda Cattafesta, Note, Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates: Nonfiduciary Liability for Money Damages Under ERISA, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 1165
(1994); Robert A. Kamp, The Argument for "Extra-Contractual"Damages Under ERISA, 82 ILL. B.J.
70 (1994).
34. In her concurring opinion in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, Justice Ginsburg was stark in her
criticism of the state of remedies under ERISA.
The Court today holds that the claims respondents asserted under Texas law are totally
preempted by § 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or
Act). That decision is consistent with our governing case law on ERISA's preemptive scope.
I therefore join the Court's opinion. But, with greater enthusiasm, as indicated by my
dissenting opinion in Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, I also join "the rising
judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly
tangled ERISA regime."
Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
35. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212-14 (removing restitution based in a contractual liability from
the equitable remedies available under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489
(1996); Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256-58 (restricting "appropriate equitable relief' under § 502(a)(3) of
ERISA to mean only those equitable remedies that were "typically available at equity"); Watkins v.
Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the only forms of
equitable relief available under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA are injunction, mandamus, and restitution). For an
excellent critique of the Supreme Court jurisprudence's concerning § 502(a) of ERISA see Langbein,
supra note 3.
36. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs. Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1024 (2008).
37. Id. at 1025.
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that Russell is a bit dated: "Russell's emphasis on protecting the 'entire
plan' from fiduciary misconduct reflects the former landscape of employee
benefit plans."
The Court, like the book's editors and contributors, recognizes that the
benefits world of the mid-1970s and early 1980s into which ERISA was
born is a changed place.
Defined contribution plans dominate the retirement plan scene
today. In contrast, when ERISA was enacted, and when Russell was
decided, "the [defined benefit] plan was the norm of American
pension practice." . . . Unlike the defined contribution plan in this

case, the disability plan at issue in Russell did not have individual
accounts; it paid a fixed benefit based on a percentage of the
employee's salary.39
In this new world, dominated by the defined contribution model,
fiduciary misconduct need not threaten the solvency of the entire
plan to reduce benefits below the amount that participants would
otherwise receive. Whether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan
assets payable to all participants and beneficiaries, or only to
persons tied to individual accounts, it creates the kind of harm that
concerned the draftsmen of §409. Consequently, our references to
the "entire plan" in Russell, which accurately reflect the operation
of §409 in the defined benefit context, are beside the point in the
defined contribution context. 40
LaRue's unambiguous support for the right of defined contribution
participants to recover for fiduciary breaches that harm the value of
the assets in an individual account is, I presume, the kind of policy
reform that several of the book's authors call for.41 Despite the
authors' repeated calls for "policy" and "legislative" changes,
LaRue suggests that it may be the Supreme Court which, after years
of inaction on the part of Congress, 42 appears to be willing to

&

38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. (citation omitted).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., Christian Weller & Teresa Chilarducci, Pension Policy Options: Meeting in the
Middle, in EMPLOYEE PENSIONS, supra note 9, at 215, 229, in which the editors note: "The loss of
traditional pensions and their incumbent features can have serious ramifications for employment
relations and the economy at large. To counter these adverse implications, this volume leads with two
broad policy goals: strengthen [defined benefit] plans and vastly improve [defined contribution] plans.
Addressing these goals would mean to introduce [defined benefit] plan features into [defined
contribution] plans and vice versa."
42. Many commentators have called on Congress to amend ERISA to provide broader protections
to plan participants and beneficiaries. See Ann C. Bertino, The Need for a Mandatory Award of
Attorney's Fees for PrevailingPlaintiffs in ERISA Benefits Cases, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 871, 902 (1992)
("In order to adequately protect plan participants under ERISA, Congress should amend section
502(g)(1) so that attorney's fees are mandatorily awarded to a prevailing plaintiff."); Justin Cummins
Meg Luger Nikolai, ERISA Reform in a Post-Enron World, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 563, 597 (2006)
("ERISA must be amended to make explicit that corporations shall affirmatively and regularly produce
information about pension status in simple terms - that is, the 'plain language' is, in fact, plain
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interpret ERISA in light of the new, defined-contribution-dominated
pension environment.
IV. CONCLUSION

Several of the book's authors emphasize the need for unions, women's
organizations, the American Association of Retired People and other
affected groups to articulate and advocate for a political climate that would
support changes to defined contribution plans and infuse them with the
virtues of defined benefit plans. The idea seems to be that, together, it
might be possible to re-make defined contribution plans into something that
looks and feels a lot like a defined benefit plan about which some
contributors wax nostalgic. Of course, at some point, such a venture might
amount to the creation of a "new" defined contribution arrangement which
is virtually indistinguishable from a defined benefit plan. I remain skeptical
of both the political feasibility and the wisdom of a new defined
contribution paradigm. Employers/plan sponsors moved away from defined
benefit plans, in part because defined contribution arrangements shifted
market and default risk (and, therefore, significant costs) onto employees
and because employees liked the flexibility and portability of defined
contribution arrangements. Defined benefit plans made sense in an era in
which most people worked with one employer for ten to twenty years. 43
language."); George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: ExtracontractualDamages Mandatedfor Benefit Claims
Actions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 611, 665 (1994) (arguing that punitive damages should be available remedies
under ERISA in some circumstances); Nicholas J. Brannick, Note, At the Crossroadsof Three Codes:
How Employers Are Using ERISA, the Tax Code, and Bankruptcy to Evade their Pension Obligations,
65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1577, 1626 (2004) ("It is time for Congress to consider legislative change to prevent
firms from using Chapter 11 to evade pension obligations.").
43. In 1983, male workers between the ages of fifty-five and sixty-four were, on average, staying
with one employer for 15.3 years while younger males between the ages of forty-five and fifty-four had
an average tenure of 12.8 years. Craig Copeland, Employee Tenure, 2006, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST.
NOTES, Apr. 2007, at 3, available at <http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRINotes_04-20071.pdf>.
By 2006, however, the average tenures of male workers ages fifty-five to sixty-four had decreased 5.8
years to a tenure of 9.5 years and male workers ages forty-five to fifty-four were down 4.7 years to an
average of 8.1 years with a single employer. Id. This decrease of tenure among traditional pension
participants signals an increase in that group's job mobility as these workers are spending significantly
less time with an employer than they were twenty-three years ago. Id.
There are three reasons to focus on the tenures of older males as representing those of

traditional pension participants. First, when using historical employment data, it is important to
remember that women have historically been underrepresented in the workforce. See Abraham Mosisa
& Steven Hipple, Trends in Labor Force Participationin the United States, MONTHLY LAB. REV. Oct.
2006, at 36, available at <http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/ 2006/10/art3full.pdf>. Second, young workers
are subject to inherent mathematical limitations on tenure durations (i.e., a twenty-five year old is
extremely unlikely to have worked twelve years for an employer). Third, it is notoriously common for
workers to switch jobs frequently while they are young. See Audrey Light, Job Mobility and Wage
Growth: Evidence from the NLSY79, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 2005, at 38, available at
<http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2005/02/art5full.pdf > ("[T]he typical worker holds about five jobs in
the first 8 years of the career.").
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In contrast, the labor market in the U.S. early in the twenty-first
century is characterized by substantial mobility. 44 Additionally, a
substantial segment of the population seems ill at ease with the paternalistic
notions that inform defined benefit plans.4 5 In other words, employees want
and need retirement vehicles that provide them with the flexibility the
current marketplace requires of them. 4 6 And many (although by no means

all) appear to be eager to manage their retirement assets in the same way
they are expected to manage their earnings and make innumerable
decisions about personal consumption.
In spite of this, the essays in Employee Pensions are characterized by a
shared, quasi-political view that if only the right mix of interest groups
could be assembled (AARP, women's organizations, organized labor,
pension advocacy groups etc.) the under-regulated defined contribution
44. See supra note 43. An increase in job mobility fits naturally with an employee's preference for
defined contribution plans as defined contribution plans are more portable than defined benefit plans.
Ann C. Foster, Portability of Pension Benefits Among Jobs, MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 1994, at 45,
available at <http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1994/07/art6full.pdf> ("A worker's ability to maintain and
transfer accumulated pension benefits when changing jobs is generally less of a problem in defined
contribution plans than in defined benefit plans."). Under a defined contribution plan, "[w]ith
comparable contributions and rates of return, a worker who switches jobs (and leaves his or her funds in
the plan of each organization) could have the same benefit amount upon retirement as a worker with an
identical salary history who worked for only one employer." Id.
45. See Watson Wyatt Worldwide, How Do Retirement Plans Affect Employee Behavior?,
WATSON WYATT INSIDER, Apr. 2005, <http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/insider/showarticle.
asp?ArticlelD=14596> ("[R]espondents overall express greater satisfaction with their defined
contribution plans [than with their defined benefit plans]."). When defined contribution plan
participants were surveyed about eight separate attributes of their plans, the three attributes that were
most approved ofby participants were the amount a participant can contribute (79.8 percent satisfied),
information about balances (74.2 percent satisfied), and availability of investment options (68.7 percent
satisfied). Id. These three attributes denote aspects of defined contribution plans that reflect individual
autonomy over pension benefits, which are unavailable in defined benefit plans. Defined benefit plans
do not require a participant to know anything about markets or investing. A worker need only pay
attention to his age, salary, and years of service in order to predict his stream of pension income. The
plan sponsor, with support from other fiduciaries, makes all decisions about how and where to invest
plan assets; the plan participant has no control over investment decisions. In practice, however, plan
participants' apparent discomfort with paternalistic aspects of defined benefit plans may fluctuate with
the investment performance of their plan assets. See Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined
ContributionPlan Participants,77 N.Y.U L. REV. 71, 76 n.18 (2002) ("It very well may be that had the
movement from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans occurred during a down market
rather than a robust one, employees may have reacted differently, perceiving the move to defined
contribution plans as taking an entitlement away from them.")
46. Michele Varnhagen's discussion of the portability issue, especially as it affects women and
others who work erratically or for shorter tenures, is thoughtful and suggests how complex portability
can be. Michelle Vanhagen, U.S. Federal Pension Policy: Its Potential and Pitfalls, in EMPLOYEE
PENSIONS, supra note 9, at 163. She notes, for example, that "some unions, whose collective bargaining
agreements assume that a certain percent of participant contributions will default and be used to bolster
the retirement benefits of long-service employees." Id. at 166. This kind of cross subsidy, from short
tenure to long tenure employees is, of course, absent in the defined contribution context. One can
readily imagine strong objections to this subsidy from women, (and others who tend to have more
flexible attachment to the work force) to this feature of defined benefit plans, assuming they were
informed of its existence.
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world could, in effect, be re-made to look like the defined benefit plans we
knew and loved.4 7 I am not suggesting that the shortcomings many of the
authors attribute to defined contribution plans are fantastical. On the
contrary, many of the critiques are valid and troubling.
What remains mysterious, even after reading the essays in Employee
Pensions, is why the "together we can" coalition has failed to come
together. Could it be that most participants in 401(k) plans are willing to
bear the market risk in exchange for simplicity and portability? Maybe
employees old enough to recall and savvy enough to pay attention know
that defined benefit arrangements were never a sure thing. ERISA
anticipates underfunding, bankruptcy, and other financial catastrophes in
Title IV 48 in which it creates the PBGC. Voluntary and involuntary plan
terminations, the PBGC's own well publicized financial problems, 49 and
47. Michele Varnhagen says: "[a]s it has become clear that 401(k) plans have eclipsed [defined
benefit] plans, many are pointing fingers of blame or trying to understand why [defined benefit] plans
lost the retirement vehicle race. Some are undertaking this inquiry in hopes of proposing changes to
revitalize [defined benefit] plans." Id. at 166.
48. Title IV of ERISA is codified at 29 U.S.C §§ 1301-1461 (2000). For the establishment of the
PBGC, see 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2000) ("There is established within the Department of Labor a body
corporate to be known as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.").
49. As of September 30, 2007, the PBGC is "guarantee[ing] payment of basic pension benefits
earned by 44 million American workers and retirees participating in 30,460 private-sector defined
benefit pension plans." PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 2007 ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT 1

(2007), available at <http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2007AMR.pdf>. To date, the PBGC is actually
responsible for paying the current and future pensions benefits of about 1,305,000 people whose
underfunded pension funds have already failed and been terminated. Id. at 6. This huge burden has left
the PBGC with a $14 billion equity deficit as of the end of its fiscal year 2007. Id.
This deficit is the result of a string of large corporations (led by many major airlines) going
bankrupt and dumping their underfunded pension plans onto the PBGC during the early part of this
decade. See Adam E. Cearley, Comment, The PBGC: Why the Retiree's TraditionalLife Raft is Sinking
and How to Bail it Out, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 181 (2006); Michael Barbanell Landres, Note,
Smoke, Mirrors, and ERISA: The False Illusion of Retirement Income Security, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1169, 1170-71 (2007); Crenshaw, supra note 20; Mary Williams Walsh, Deficit Soars at Agency that
Insures Pension Plans, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 2004, § C, at 1. In 2001, the PBGC had an equity surplus
of $7.8 billion. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra, at 76-77. In 2002, after the failure of a couple
major corporations, most notably United Airlines with its $7 billion in unfunded pensions, Cearley,
supra, at 188-89, the PBGC ended its year with a $3.5 billion equity deficit, PENSION BENEFIT GUAR.
CORP., supra, at 76-77. By 2004, the PBGC's equity deficit peaked at $23.5 billion and has been
declining since. Id.
Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA), Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4
(2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 and 42 U.S.C.), and the Pension Protection Act
of 2006 (PPA), Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and
29 U.S.C.), to help deal with the PBGC's equity deficit and underfunded pensions in general. The DRA
adjusted the premiums that the PBGC could charge plan sponsors of defined benefit pension plans.
PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra, at 8. The PPA made "a number of changes to the pension
insurance system, including premiums, guarantee rules, reporting and disclosure, multiemployer plan
withdrawal liability, and the missing participants program." Id.
However, despite these acts and the reduction of the PBCG's equity deficit in the past couple
of years, the future outlook for the PBGC is still uncertain. Troubled companies now have a proven
means to help them shed unwieldy underfunded defined benefit pension plans by transferring their
obligations to the PBGC, which leaves the PCBG in a precarious financial position. See Cearley, supra,
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the very public failures of prominent plans 50 could rightly cause an
employee to conclude that the self-directed investing required of a DC plan
participant is a reasonable option.
Political activity, as David Madland argues" in chapter 10, depends
upon three things: "the means to be able to protest, such as skills,
resources, and organization; a motive to be involved; and opportunities to
take action., 52 Maybe it is true, as Madland suggests, that declining union
density and dogmatic American individualism account for the absence of a
sustained effort to change the laws regulating employee pensions. Or
maybe, instead, the vast majority of plan participants reject the need to
"come together" to return to a pension vehicle (the defined benefit plan),
which was never entirely secure and fails to offer features that make it
useful in the modem workplace.
If, with LaRue, the Supreme Court is signaling a willingness to reform
ERISA so that its protections reflect workplace reality of the increasing
prevalence of defined contribution plans, the political coalition some of the
contributors dream of may not be needed. "Together we can" might be true
but unnecessary.

at 181 ("By taking advantage of the deficiencies in the bankruptcy statutes . . . and.. ERISA.
companies entering bankruptcy are able to shed significant pension obligations that were never intended
to be borne by the PBGC."); Landres, supra, at 1170 ("[T]he bankruptcy of airlines with underfunded
pension plans has the potential to create a vicious cycle of bankruptcies and plan terminations within
the airline industry
. More disturbing yet, this cycle appears to have spread beyond the airline
industry.") (internal quotation marks omitted). For an excellent overview of the current problems still
facing the PBGC see Landres, supra.
50. See supra note 20.
51. Madland, supra note 18, at 187.
52. Id. at 193-94.

